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LEGAL PROTECTION OF DIGNITY

side knowledge could have been advantageously used.' ""
To require control in terms of ten percent of the common stock diminishes
the effectiveness of the statute. The statute itself vests the power
in the Securities Exchange Commission to exempt certain securities
and transactions, 4s and exceptions to the statute should not be created by narrow judicial interpretation 9 One authority is of the
opinion that "the express purpose of preventing the unfair use of
inside information might suggest an application of the statute to
all cases which may come literally within its scope." 50 By virtue
of the ten percent and six months arbitrary cut off points, the statute
is already limited, and the court should not limit further what is
remedial legislation 5 when, as in Chemical Fund, -there is the slightest possibility for unfair use of inside information.
SARAH

E.

PARKER

Torts-Dignity As a Legally Protectable Interest
A recent New Jersey decision' presents the question of what
injury, if any, has been suffered by a mother who has been denied
the opportunity to obtain an abortion. Plaintiffs, a defective infant and his parents, brought a malpractice action against the
mother's obstetricians alleging that they negligently assured Mrs.
Glietman that her recent illness of German measles would not
affect the infant then in gestation.2 The basis of plaintiffs' claim
was that defendants' repeated assurances induced Mrs. Glietman
""Painter, The Evolving Role of Section 16(b), 62 MIcE. L. REv. 649, 678
(1964).
,8 Cook 387.
'9 Hamilton 1455.
8 Meeker 958.
81Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959). As the opinion
states,

"One can speculate on whether the moral or ethical values are altered by the

passage of 24 hours, but the statute makes an honest if not an honorable man
out of the insider in that period." Id. at 845. A line had to be drawn somewhere by the lawmakers as in any other area governed by statute.

'Glietman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).

'At present it is well established that rubella virus can cause malformations of the eye (cataract and microphthalmia); internal ear
(congenital deafness due to destruction of the Organ of Corti) ; heart
(persistence of the ductus arteriosus as well as atrial and -ventricular
septal defects) ; and occasionally of the teeth (enamel layer). The
virus may also be responsible for some cases of brain abnormalties
and mental retardation.
J. LANGMAN, MEDIcAL EMBRYOLOGY 73 (1963).
In the principle case the
infant had substantial defects in sight, hearing, and speech.
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to forego an abortion which, plaintiffs asserted, would have freed
the infant from a life with defects, the mother from emotional
harm, and the father from added expenses. Defendants denied
plaintiffs' allegations and testified that they had advised Mrs. Glietman of a twenty per cent chance of some deformity. The trial
court, on motion by defendants, dismissed the suit for want of
proximate cause and because it felt the New Jersey statute prohibited the suggested abortion. The factual dispute, therefore, was
not resolved by the jury.
On appeal the New Jersey Supreme Court took plaintiffs' evidence as true4 and further assumed that Mrs. Glietman could have
obtained an abortion unattended by any criminal sanctions and
failed to do so in reliance upon defendants' assurances. The decision of the lower court was affirmed, three justices dissenting.
The reason for affirmance as to the infant was that he had suffered
no damages cognizable at law.' The parents were denied recovery
8

Any person who maliciously or without lawful justification, with
intent to cause or procure the miscarriage of a pregnant woman,
administers or prescribes or advises or directs her to take or swallow
any poison, drug, medicine, or noxious thing, or uses any instrument or means whatever, is guilty of a high misdemeanor.
N. J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 87-1 (1953).
'This assumption will also be made throughout this note. It might be
proper to suggest that the court's decision may be due, in part, to the improbability of plaintiffs' allegations. It has been stated that a large percentage of malpractice litigation is without foundation, Regan, Medical Legal
Problems-The Physician's and Lawyer's Viewpoint, in MEDICOLEGAL
SYmposium 17 (1955), and the likelihood that a practicing obstetrician
would either not know of the possible effects of rubella during pregnancy or

would lie about them does indeed seem small.

'Although our prime concern is the mother, the issue raised by the
infant's claim warrants mention. Since there was no evidence that measures could have been taken to improve the infant's chances of a normal
life, see, e.g., Sylvia v. Gobeille, 220 A.2d 222 (R.I. 1966) ; First Nat'l Bank
v. Rankin, 59 Wash.2d 288, 367 P.2d 835 (1962), the decision seems correct
because to recover he must maintain that he should not have been born,
and it does seem impossible to "[W]eigh the value of life with impairments
against the nonexistence of life itself." Glietman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22--,
227 A.2d 689, 692 (1967). Two cases were cited in support. In Zepeda v.
Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), an illegitimate child
sought recovery against his father for damages caused by his birth out of
wedlock. Although the court found the existence of a tort, recovery was
denied on the grounds that recognition of such a claim should come from
the legislature. In Williams v. State, 18 N.Y.2d 481, 223 N.E.2d 343, 276
N.Y.S.2d 885 (1966), plaintiff's mother was raped while a patient at a state
hospital for the mentally ill, and plaintiff sued for damages caused by the
state's negligence in failing properly to protect its patient. The court found
no wrong was done to plaintiff. For more on the "wrongful life" action see
notes, 43 N.D.L. REv. 99 (1966); 11 S.D.L. Rav. 180 (1966); 18 STAN. L.
REv. 859 (1966).
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because 1) they also suffered no damages cognizable at law and
2) even if there were legal damages, policy considerations "prevent
this Court from allowing tort damages for the denial of the opportunity to take an embryonic life."6 It is submitted that the court
should have determined whether the abortion was legal in New
Jersey before affirming the dismissal and that, in any event, Mrs.
Glietman suffered an injury to her dignity for which she should be
compensated.
The court's assumption was only that plaintiff could have obtained a non-criminal abortion, the place being undetermined, and
policy reasons were still found to prevent recovery. This is a
logical conclusion if the abortion were illegal in New Jersey. If,
however, such abortions were legal in that state,' then it does not
follow that public policy is a bar to plaintiff's recovery as the law
would have weighed the relative rights of the mother and the embryo, and concluded that the mother's was the superior one. Otherwise, the abortion should be illegal. Thus, the fact that the infant
"would almost surely choose life with defects as against no life at
all"' would be of no moment as the choice would not be his at that
time. The choice would be the mother's and compensation for the
denial of that right should not be withheld because an exercise
thereof might result in the termination of an embryonic life. The
right to end that life would be the very right impliedly given if the
abortion were legal. It seems, therefore, that a determination of
the legality of such an abortion in New Jersey was necessary to decide the case correctly. Given the other elements of liability, the
decision would depend on whether plaintiff could have obtained the
abortion had she been correctly advised by the defendants.
As to the issue of damages, the plaintiff may encounter some
difficulty. In a majority of the cases where the question has been
considered, recovery to the parents for harm resulting from the
birth of a child was denied on the grounds that it was either too
remote9 or was against public policy. 10 Although plaintiff is seeking damages for emotional harm, the event which gave rise to that
Glietman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22,--, 227 A.2d 689, 693 (1967).

'The assumption must be that the abortion is legal in New Jersey for

even if plaintiff could have easily been aborted in a nearby state, the court
would be reluctant to lend its aid to the circumvention of its own law.
But see, dissenting opinion, id. at-, 227 A.2d at 703.
Id. at -, 227 A.2d at 693.
Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934).
Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (1957).
0
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harm was the birth of her child. Several factors, however, are in
her favor. In the first place, it seems without reason to establish
a right in the parents to decide that they do not wish to risk a deformed child and then deny recovery when that right is wrongfully
taken from them. Secondly, a recent California decision, Ciustodio
v. Bauer," may well be indicative of a new trend. In that case
plaintiff-wife, after bearing nine children and being advised that
another might threaten her health, underwent a sterilization operation. The operation was apparently unsuccessful, as a year and
a half later Mrs. Custodio gave birth to her tenth child. The decision of the lower court which had sustained defendants' demurrer
was reversed. The court stated, "It is clear that if successful on the
issue of liability, they [the plaintiffs] have established a right to
more than nominal damages." 2 Doerr v. Villate,'8 wherein plaintiff sued for breach of an oral contract to sterilize her husband,
was discussed in the opinion. Although the sole issue there was
whether the two-year statute of limitations for personal injuries
or the five-year statute for oral contracts applied, the Custodio
court observed that Doerr does demonstrate, "that the birth of a
child may be something less than the 'blessed event' referred to in
those cases [those denying recovery].
Of course this reasoning
is of no avail unless the abortion were found to be legal in New
Jersey.
But if the abortion were illegal in New Jersey, has Mrs. Glietman then suffered no injury? It is suggested that she has, that the
real injury is an affront to her dignity as a human being, and that
this is true regardless of whether she could have obtained an abortion. Mrs. Glietman, by virtue of the fact that she is a human
being, had a right to know that she might become the mother of
a defective child. To the extent that she was uninformed of that
possibility, she was that much less an individual.
In examining plaintiff's injury it is helpful initially to inquire
into the nature of defendants' corresponding duty under these
facts. In general, a fiduciary relationship exists between a physician and his patient.'- A necessary extention of this is the duty
Cal. Rptr. 463 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
"1Id. at 477.
174 III. App. 2d 332, 220 N.E.2d 767 (1966).
"'59 Cal. Rptr. at 475.
"See, e.g., Batty v. Dental Bd., 57 Ariz. 239, 112 P.2d 870 (1941);
Woods v. Brumlop, 71 N.M. 221, 377 P.2d 520 (1962).
1159
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of the physician to give accurate, truthful information in -the absence of any justification not to do so. 6 Alleged breaches of this
duty are most frequently encountered in the so-called "informed
7 is an example. There plaintiff
consent" cases. Natanson v. KlineV
was injured by radiation therapy following a mastectomy. The
claim was that since Mrs. Natanson had not been advised of the
risks inherent in the treatment, her consent to it was not informed.
In reversing a judgement for the defendants, the court observed,
Anglo-American law starts with the premise of thorough-going
self-determination. It follows that each man is considered to
be the master of his own body, and he may, if he be of sound
mind, expressly prohibit the performance of life-saving surgery,
or other medical treatment. A doctor might well believe that
an operation or form of treatment is desirable or necessary but
the law does not permit him to substitute his own judgenent
for that of the patient by any form of artifice or deception.' 8
Here, as opposed to Glietman, it is easy to see why the defendant had the duty to inform plaintiff because with this information
the latter could make an intelligent decision. But does the law
require such disclosure merely to avoid a technical battery? The
better analysis, and the one which the quoted material tends to
support, is that as a matter of human dignity an individual should
be accorded the right to have such information. The right goes
beyond the right to determine one's own course in that it embraces
our very identity as individuals. 9 Performing an operation without valid consent is only one way to offend the dignity. On the
basis of this analysis plaintiff's legal inability to obtain an abortion
should neither preclude her from this same right to know, nor
should it excuse defendants from the performance of their duty.
(1967), lists nine factors which have
1 Note, 20 OKLA. L. REv. 214
affected the duty: likelihood of injury, seriousness of injury, feasibility of
alternative methods, certainty of particular method, interest of patient,
knowledge of patient, emotional stability of patient, necessity of treatment,
and existence of emergency.
, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, aff'd on rehearing, 187 Kan. 186, 354
(1960).at 406-07, 350 P.2d at 1104.
P.2d18 670
186 Kan.
19 Perhaps the poet made this distinction between merely determining
one's own course and the broader concept of dignity when he wrote,
"It matters not how straight the gate,
How charged with punishment the scroll
I am the master of my fate:
I am the captain of my soul."
Henly, "Invictus," A TREASTJRY OF G"AT POEMS ENGLISH AN AMERICAN
985 (1942).
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An analogous situation is presented in United States v. Kalish."
There petitioner, as a tactical move advised by counsel, refused to
take the required step forward at his induction and was arrested.
As a result of the arrest, he was photographed and fingerprinted,
and after his aquittal and subsequent induction into the service,
he sought to have these fingerprint and photograph records destroyed. The government resisted, contending that since the Army
had these same records on petitioner, the destruction of only one
of the files could be of no benefit to him. The court held that as a
matter of privacy and personal dignity petitioner had the right to
have the records destroyed. Here petitioner stood to lose only a
dignitary sense if the requested relief were denied, just as Mrs.
Glietman lost when the requested information was denied her. The
destruction of the records did not free petitioner from having
records kept on him, just as the requested information would not
have freed Mrs. Glietman from having a defective child. This,
however, is unimportant because both have been injured in their
dignity; and for this there should be some legal redress.
Dignity is protected in other contexts, although few courts have
expressly acknowledged that dignity is, in fact, the interest being
safeguarded. In assault a cause of action arises for the mere
insult of being threatened, 1 while in battery an offensive touching
with no physical harm is sufficient. The true injury in being spit
on 22 is the indignity of it-the dignity is more battered than the
person. The recent recognition of mental distress as a cause of
action rather than as an element of damages resulting from some
other tort2 3 represents an increasing concern for the dignity of man.

Privacy is perhaps the best example with which to demonstrate that
dignity is an interest worthy of the law's protection. This expanding tort is a judicial recognition of the citizen's need to be secure
in his thoughts, and unfettered in his customs and beliefs. It is
the law's response to the stimulus of an ever-encroaching society.
If state intrusion into marital affairs 24 does not offend the dignity
of the citizen, then in what manner is he offended? If peeping
tom laws are not designed to protect the integrity of the individual
in his home, then what is the protected interest?
"0271 F. Supp. 968 (D.P.R. 1967).
W. PRossER, TORTS § 10 (3rd ed. 1964).
" Draper v. Baker, 61 Wis. 450, 21 N.W. 527 (1884).
" W. PRossEa, TORTS § 11 (3rd ed. 1964).
" Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965).
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Perhaps it is because dignity and individuality are so intangible
that damages are rarely given on these express grounds. Yet it is
clear that this has not impeded courts from granting relief in the
assault, battery, mental distress, and privacy contexts. In the assault situation the plaintiff need not actually be afraid, for the
protection is against a purely mental disturbance of his personal
integrity.25 In the medical setting, an operation which exceeds that
for which consent is given may subject the physician to liability
even though the operation was beneficial.2 6 Surely dignity is being
protected here, albeit in the form of personal security. And once
dignity is recognized to be the real injury to Mrs. Glietman, damages
no longer present a problem. Professor Bloustein expresses the
concept best by concluding that in privacy actions,
Unlike many other torts, the harm caused is not one which may
be repaired and the loss suffered is not one which may be made
good by an award of damages. The injury is to our individuality,
to our dignity as individuals, and the legal remedy represents
a social vindication of the human spirit27 thus threatened rather
than a recompense for the loss suffered.
It is submitted that Mrs. Glietman, simply because she is a
human being, had a right to know facts which so vitally concerned
her. The defendants, having accepted her as their patient, had the
duty to respond truthfully to her inquiries. That duty was breached
and, for this, there should be some legal remedy." Recovery should
not be made to depend upon what use, if any," the mother may
have made of this information, since this is pure conjecture. She
"' See note 20 supra.
2o See, e.g., Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905).
Bloustein, Privacy As an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to
Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 962, 1002-03 (1964). See also Westin,
Science, Privacy, and Freedom; Issues and Proposals for the 1970's, 66
COLUM. L. REv. 1003, 1205 (1966).
Compare, Kalven, Privacy in Tort
Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAw & CONTEmp. PROB. 326

(1966).
"' It could be argued that by granting Mrs. Glietman a recovery, the
court would be indirectly punishing defendants for not aiding in the circumvention of state law. To whatever extent this reasoning is valid, the
policy of protecting the individual in his dignity should outweigh such a
consideration.
"' One use may have been to prepare, emotionally and financially for
the possible tragedy. See, Smith, Therapeutic Privilege to Withhold Specific Diagnosis From Patient Sick with Serious or Fatal Disease, 19 TENN.

L. REv. 349 (1946).

212
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should have been informed regardless of whether it would be of any
benefit to her. That a decision favorable to plaintiff may deter
other such abuses by a powerful profession is additional grounds
for recovery.
LAURENCE V. SENN, JR.

